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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
IMAGINE ALL THE WOMEN 
Power, Gender and the Transformative 
Possibilities of the South African Constitution 
Penelope E. Andrews 
It is argued here that a creative jurisprudence of equality coupled with 
substantive interpretation of the content of 'socio-economic ' rights should 
restore social justice as a premier foundational value of our constitutional 
democracy side by side, if not interactively with, human dignity, equality, 
freedom, accountability, responsiveness and openness. 1 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore the South African Constitution, and more 
particularly, the Bill of Rights, as a vehicle for social and economic 
transformation. By analyzing the provisions relating to gender equality in 
South Africa's Constitution, as well as decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, this chapter will examine whether the constitutional rights 
framework in South Africa contains within it the transformative 
possibilities2 that will lead to gender equality in all spheres of South 
African society, and particularly in the economic sphere. Karl Klare refers 
ta transformative constitutionalism as 
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical 
context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country's 
political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory, and egalitarian direction.?' 
This chapter's focus on women as a group should not be seen as 
detracting from the contemporary social reality, where the condition of 
poverty affects a large number of South Africans of all genders." However, 
black women continue to be disproportionately represented in all negative 
indicators, including poverty, rates of unemployment, and occurrence of 
AIDS. The analysis in this chapter proceeds on the belief that women's 
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access to resources and women's economic empowerment is integrally 
linked to the legal, political and , social conditions that create the 
possibilities for such access and empowerment. Sandra Liebenberg 
explains the transformative potential of the South African constitutional 
framework: 
Unlike many classic liberal constitutions, its primary concern is not to 
restrain State power, but to facilitate a fundamental change in unjust 
political, economic and social relations in South Africa.5 
In line with this theme of transformation, and attempting to provide a 
comprehensive approach to gender equality, the analysis in this chapter 
not only references the constitutional text and constitutional jurisprudence 
that focus on socio-economic rights, but also engages with constitutional 
text and decisions that articulate a vision of equality, a constitutional 
proscription of violence against women, and cultural impediments that 
may thwart the quest for gender equality. 
Constitutionalism and Socio-Economic Rights 
In South Africa's evolving constitutional democracy, constitutional · 
adjudication is a central component of the basic governance structure. 
Such a framework, at least symbolically, signifies that the needs and 
interests of the poor are a matter of national public concern. In addition, 
such a framework raises the possibility of removing the socio-economic 
barriers to full citizenship.6 The inclusion of social and economic rights in 
the. constitution therefore converts the issue of the needs of the poor into 
the realm of legal entitlement. As the South African scholar Daniel Brand 
notes: 
First, courts' adjudication of socio-economic rights claims becomes part of 
the political discourse, even a medium through which this discourse partly 
plays out. Second, courts also occupy a symbolic, or perhaps more 
accurately, an exemplary, role with respect to poverty and need 
discourses-their vocabulary, the conceptual structures they rely on, the 
rhetorical strategies they employ infiltrate and so influence and shape the 
political discourses around poverty and need.7 
Although Karl Klare has cautioned that the "decision" to "accomplish 
some significant portion" of the law-making process "through 
adjudication" is one "fraught with institutional consequences.r" litigating 
in the pursuit of socio-economic rights opens up great possibilities for 
women. For women, especially black women, the Constitution's 
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incorporation of a host of socio-economic rights, and particularly its 
transformative potential, as outlined above, is an important antidote to the 
axis of gender subordination: namely, poverty, violence and custom.9 
This chapter is limited in scope. Although it highlights the powerful 
symbolic and substantive possibilities of the constitutionalizing of socio- 
economic rights and rendering such rights fully justiciable, it does not 
address key economic questions that are central to reducing poverty." Jn 
addition, it highlights merely one aspect of the relationship between law 
and economic development, namely, the possibilities generated by the 
constitutional enforcement of rights." The prevalence of poverty, as a 
recurring reality of the majority of Africa's population, including South 
Africa, continues to be an issue of global concern that has taxed the 
creativity .of a range of scholars.12 
There is a vast body of literature pointing to the limitations of rights 
discourse in the face of economic structures that reinforce economic 
inequality." Legal scholars such as Upendra Baxi and Boa de Sousa 
Santos have eloquently argued that the-language of human rights has in 
effect replaced the language of economic redistribution and thereby has 
appropriated other ethical discourses. 14 Indeed, the seductive possibilities 
generated by litigation for social and economic rights may 
disproportionately influence communities, especially women, to redirect 
their attention from non-legal transformative strategies that may produce a 
deeper and more enduring economic, political and social justice." This 
debate is a vigorous one within the contemporary human rights community 
of scholars and advocates, and is also a hackneyed one reminiscent of the 
earlier civil rights struggle of the United States.16 
By integrating the questions of women's economic empowerment 
within the context of violence against women and customs that impede 
women's equality, I am influenced by the critical voices of legal scholars 
who insist on a comprehensive intersectional approach to rights. I am in 
particular referring to the scholarship of Angela Harris and Taunya Banks, 
who exhort us to eschew essentialism in, theorizing women's 
subordination.17 In addition, Amanda Gouws has attempted in her work to 
deconstruct the gendered nature of South African citizenship in its many 
guises.18 The approach. of the South African Bill of Rights, namely, an 
expanded notion of equality, distinguishes it from many other 
constitutional projects, notably that of the United States. In South Africa, 
constitutional adjudication occurs in a context that recognizes that 
disadvantage and discrimination are deeply embedded in the political, 
economic and legal systems, and that the legacy of apartheid and sexism 
will continue into the foreseeable future. 19 The constitutional text and its 
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interpretation are therefore predicated on a need to derogate purposively 
from the status quo. As the first President of the Constitutional Court has 
noted: ' 
We live in a society in ~hich there are great disparities in wealth. Millions 
of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is 
a high level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not 
have access to clean water or to adequate health services. These conditions 
already· existed when the Constitution was adopted, and a commitment to 
address them, and to transform 'our society into one in which there will be 
human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new 
constitutional order." 
In other words, both text and interpretation are mandated to transform 
social and economic relations." 
Rights Protected in the South African Constitution 
The South African Constitution, in particular the Bill of Rights, has 
been universally heralded as one of the most impressive human rights 
documents of the twentieth century.22 Section 1 states very clearly the 
supremacy of the Constitution, and also states that the new democratic 
state is founded on values that include "human dignity and the 
achievement of equality" as well as "non-racialism and non-sexism." The 
Constitution's generous coverage of a broad range of categories of 
discrimination, including race, gender, sexual orientation, and national 
origin, seeks to reassure all South Africans that discrimination in its 
obvious, as well as intricate variations, will not be tolerated.23 
Covering both direct and indirect discrimination24 and recognition of 
the tenacity of institutionalized discrimination, the Bill of Rights also 
covers "intersectional discrimination," noting that "no person may unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds. "25 Judge Goldstone, in an early gender equality case, noted the 
complex relationships among the prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
exhortin~ against the temptation to force them into neatly self-contained 
grounds. 6 
This comprehensive definition of equality also embodies a clear 
commitment to affirmative action, which provides that: 
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.27 
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In addition, the Bill of Rights outlaws violence against women in both 
the public and private sphere,28 as well as protecting a woman's right to 
"bodily' and psychological integrity," including the "right to make 
decisions concerning reproduction.?" The Bill of Rights also protects 
freedom of expression given that it does not involve advocacy of hatred 
based on race, ethnicity, ~ender or religion, and that it does not constitute 
incitement to cause harm. 0 
But the incorporation of socio-economic rights arguably holds the key 
to unraveling much of the subordination and disadvantage that 
disproportionately burden women. Most particularly, these rights that 
incorporate education,31 housing,32 health care, food, water and social 
security,33 provide, at least within the formal legal paradigm, a limited 
access for women to pursue some form of economic empowerment. 
The rights of children are comprehensively embraced, especially as 
they relate to their social and economic well-being. Children are therefore 
given the right to "basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and 
social services.v" Children are also protected from "maltreatment, neglect, 
abuse or degradation't" and "exploitative labor practices.?" These rights 
are provided on demand, and the provision does not include the limitation 
found in other socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights, namely, that the 
state provide them progressively and "within 'its available resources." 
Although the Constitution is clear about the rights of cultural, religious 
or linguistic communities to "enjoy their culture, practice their religion 
and use their language.v" they cannot do so if those practices violate the 
principle of equality. This provides women in those distinct communities 
significant protections, ensuring that their membership in their .discrete 
communities is not compromised by their being relegated to a second-class 
status. The Constitution embodies several bodies to promote the rights in 
the Bill of Rights, including the Human Rights Commission and the 
Commission for Gender Equality.38 
The Constitutional Court's Rights Interpretation 
Since its establishment in 1995, the Constitutional Court has had 
occasion. to consider the application and interpretation of equality, 
particularly gender equality, and has for the most part articulated a 
definition of equality that considers comprehensively the many ways that 
South African women experience discrimination· and disadvantage. The 
Court has elaborated at length what equality means, and in its several 
judgments has applied the equality principle in a manner that is mindful of 
the context in which the discrimination occurs, and the lived reality of the 
parties under consideration. In addition, the Court has focused on the goal 
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of the Constitution, namely, the achievement of dignity and equality for all 
South Africans. The Court has therefore embraced a substantive definition 
of equality, as opposed to a mere formalistic one, in effect focusing on the 
disparate impact of laws, policies and practices, as opposed to their strict 
equal treatment of the genders.39 
One of the first cases on gender equality involved an unmarried father 
who challenged the provisions of the Child Care Act, which permitted the 
adoption of children born out of wedlock without the consent of the 
father." For children born in wedlock, the consent of both parents was 
required. The father successfully challenged the law and it was declared 
unconstitutional. In evaluating the Child Care Act, and particularly the 
gender equality issues raised in this case, the late Justice Mahomed noted: 
In considering appropriate legislative alternatives, parliament should be 
acutely sensitive to the deep disadvantage experienced by single mothers 
in our society. Any legislative initiative should not exacerbate that 
disadvantage. 41 
Adopting a contextual approach, the Court stated that a mother's 
"biological relationship with the child," nurtured during pregnancy and 
breastfeeding, is a special one.42 The Court also noted that the mother 
gives "succor and support" to a child that is "very direct and not 
comparable to that of a father.v" In its analysis, the Court surveyed the 
several systems of marriage in South Africa, including some that were not 
formal." Children who were products of such informal unions were 
rendered illegitimate, therefore disposing of the father's permission for 
adoption. Such situations of non-recognition placed fathers at an enormous 
disadvantage vis a vis their children with respect to adoption, and .were 
therefore discriminatory. In addition, the Court also considered that the 
core issue was really the relationship between a father and a child, and that 
the statute was too broad in its blanket exclusion of the need for an 
unmarried father's permission for adoption of his child. The Constitutional 
Court, however, citing the best interest of the child, declined to allow 
further appeal to set aside the adoption, but instructed Parliament to 
remedy the situation in a revised statute. 
The second case, one in which the Court's analysis provides a lengthy 
blueprint for the approach to equality in South Africa, has been fairly 
controversial. In this case the applicant, a convicted prisoner, challenged a 
Presidential pardon that pardoned certain categories of prisoners, including 
women in prison, whohad children under the age of twelve at the time of 
South Africa's first election.45 
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Hugo challenged the Presidential pardon on the basis that it violated 
his constitutional rights to equality and that it discriminated against him on 
the basis of gender. The Court, in its judgment, went through an elaborate 
discussion of equality. It then applied the two-pronged test outlined in the 
Constitution, namely, that if discrimination is alleged and found on any of 
the particular grounds, such as race, gender, and marital status, that finding 
creates a presumption of unfairness.46 The person against whom the 
allegation of discrimination is made must then rebut the presumption of 
unfairness by showing the validity of the action. The Court, in its analysis, 
looked at the Presidential pardon and found it to be unfair; the need for the 
President to rebut the presumption arose. The Court examined the reasons 
for the Presidential pardon, including· an evaluation of those who would 
benefit.from the pardon. These included children whose mothers or fathers 
were in prison. 
The Court then examined the other group who benefited from the 
pardon, namely, 
women, the most disadvantaged group in South African society. The Court 
acknowledged that mothers are the primary caregivers of children, but it 
also recognized that this reinforced a stereotype about women, child· 
caring, and child-rearing. Despite this, Justice O'Regan noted: 
(' 
To determine whether the discrimination is unfair it is necessary to 
recognize that although the long-term goal of our constitutional order is 
equal treatment, insisting upon equal treatment in all circumstances of 
established inequality may well result in the entrenchment of that 
inequality.47 
The Court adopted a pragmatic approach and tried to place the issue in the 
South African context. Observing that women have historically been 
discriminated against, the Court's approach to equality will likely benefit 
but it will not perpetuate a disadvantage. 
In this case, mothers have been afforded an advantage on the basis of a 
proposition that is generally speaking true. There is no doubt that the goal 
of equality entrenched in our constitution would be better served if the 
responsibilities of child-rearing were more fairly shared between fathers 
and mothers. The simple fact is that at present they are not.48 
Disputing that women are put at a disadvantage when they are perceived 
as the primary caregivers of children, Justice O'Regan noted further: 
The profound disadvantage lies not in the President's statement, but in the 
social fact of the role played by mothers in child-rearing and, more 
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particularly, in the inequality which results from it. There can be no doubt 
that where reliance upon the generalization results in greater disadvantage 
for mothers, it would almost without question constitute unfair 
discrimination.49 
The dissent forcefully challenged the stereotypes the majority opinion 
appeared to perpetuate, stating that· the Constitution is meant to be 
transformative. Part of that transformative vision is not to reinforce old 
stereotypes, but to pursue a vision in which, in this case, fathers are also 
seen as caregivers of children. The dissent objected strongly to the 
pragmatic approach that the majority took. Justice Kriegler insisted that 
where some rebuttal is provided for the presumption of unfairness, such 
rebuttal must-be scrutinized thoroughly and must not be "discharged with 
relative ease."50 He took issue with the rationale that women were the 
primary caregivers of young children, stating this generalization to be 
a root cause of women's inequality in our society. It is both a result and a 
cause of prejudice: a societal attitude which relegates women to a 
subservient, occupationally inferior yet unceasingly onerous role. It is a 
relic and feature of the patriarchy which the Constitution so vehemently 
condemns.51 
The majority had considered an alternative, that is, to release fathers 
of children under the age of twelve, but in assessing this alternative, noted 
first that there are significantly larger numbers of male prisoners in South 
Africa than female prisoners, so the numbers of men who would be 
released would be enormous. Second, the Court recognized the serious 
problem of crime in South Africa and the public outcry that would follow 
a large release of male prisoners. The dissenting opinion voiced its alarm 
at the stereotypes that were reinforced in the majority's judgment.52 The 
Hugo decision, although controversial, has been praised in many quarters 
for specifically contextualizing women's oppression and the 
discr.imination that women suffer in South Africa. But the Court has had 
difficulty coming to grips with a vision or articulation of equality that 
some commentators have argued is inconsistent.53 
The Court has expanded its vision on equality to examine the impact of 
violence on women's equality. In 2000 the Constitutional Court 
confronted a challenge to the constitutionality of a provision in the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act which, it was argued, reversed the 
onus of proof in domestic violence matters and thus violated the right of 
d i 54Th. an accused person to be presume innocent. e issue- arose out of the 
conviction of the appellant in the lower court for breaking an interdict 
issued by the court asking him not to assault ~is wife or prevent her or 
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other clients from entering or leaving their homes. He was found guilty 
under jhe Prevention of Family Violence Act of 1993. He argued that the 
section under which he was arrested was unconstitutional to the extent that 
it placed an onus on him to prove no guilt. Justice Sachs, writing for the 
majority in a unanimous decision, embarked on a thoughtful analysis of 
the need to deal comprehensively and effectively with the problem of 
domestic violence. He described the "hidden, repetitive character" of 
domestic violence, its ubiquity in cutting across class, race, culture and 
geographic boundaries, and the deleterious consequences for society of its 
persistence. He characterized domestic violence as a matter of gender 
equality, noting that because of the gender-specific nature of domestic 
violence, it mirrored patriarchal domination in a particularly abhorrent 
manner. In proceeding to analyze the conflicting rights at stake, the Court 
found that the presumption of innocence had not been disturbed because 
there were other mechanisms in place to ensure an "accessible, speedy, 
simple and effective" process. 
This judgment follows the Hugo and Fraser decisions in 
contextualizing the contemporary reality of South African women. In 
South Africa widespread violence against women in both the public and 
private sphere is a cause for great concern. Indeed, some would argue that 
such violence constitutes a continual violation of women's human rights." 
Justice Sachs, writing for the majority, forcefully acknowledges the need 
to eradicate such violence without constraining the constitutional rights of 
the perpetrators. 
Feminist advocates and human rights advocates have argued that 
private violence, indeed any violence, against women is odious; and that 
the state ought to deal with this problem aggressively. Although the Ba/oyi 
decision gives some succor to victims of domestic violence, there is still 
some dissonance between certain cultural attitudes, fueled by a particular 
brand of South African masculinity that gives rise to such violence, and 
the laudable statements of the Court." Closing this gap will require a 
recognition that the structural and attitudinal impediments to the "right to 
be free from private violence'v" as articulated in the Bill of Rights can 
only be eradicated by a combination of governmental assaults which 
include education, access to resources, and continued vigilance regarding 
the extent and persistence of violence. The Constitutional Court, at least, is 
doing its part, but it needs to be bolstered by other institutional 
arrangements that will include both legal and extra-legal measures. 
It is with respect to the implementation of socio-economic rights that 
the Constitution holds much promise. The Constitutional Court's decisions 
regarding the enforcement of socio-economic rights has shown that these 
Andrews: Power, Gender & the South African Constitution 24 l 
rights can bring meaningful relief to the poorest in the country. In 2000 the 
Constitutional Court had to consider the right to housing as incorporated in 
Section 26.58 Although the Court had had occasion to interpret the right to 
health a few years prior,59,the Grootboom decision was awaited with much 
anticipation and is widely regarded as an international test case on the 
enforceability of social and economic rights/" The case concerned an 
application for temporary shelter brought by a group of people, including a 
number of children, who were without shelter following their brutal 
eviction from private land on Which they were squatting. The conditions 
under which the community lived were deplorable; they had access to one 
tap and no sanitation facilities. The Court affirmed that the government 
had a duty in .. terms of Section 26 of the Constitution (the right to adequate 
housing) to adopt reasonable policy, legislative and budgetary measures to 
provide relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over their 
heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions. Justice Yacoob, 
writing for a unanimous court noted: 
I am conscious that it is an extremely difficult task for the state to meet 
these obligations in the conditions that prevail in our country. This is 
recognized by the Constitution, which expressly provides that the state is 
not obliged to go beyond available resources or to realize these rights 
immediately. I stress however, that despite all these qualifications, these 
are rights, and the Constitution obliges the state to give effect to them. This 
is an obligation that courts can, and in appropriate circumstances, must 
enforce.61 
The judgment also dealt in detail with the implications of the children's 
socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
Although this decision has been widely hailed as setting an important 
precedent for the enforcement of socio-economic rights at both the local 
and global level, many commentators have expressed disappointment in 
the Court's focus on "reasonableness." They instead argue that the Court 
should have applied the "minimum core approach" as adopted in the 
interpretation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.62 
In The Treatment Action case,63 the appeal to the Constitutional Court 
was directed at reversing orders made in a high court against the 
government because of perceived shortcomings in its response to an aspect 
of the HIV/AIDS challenge. The court found that the government had not 
reasonably addressed the need to reduce the risk of HIV-positive mothers' 
transmitting the disease to their babies at birth. More .speciflcally, the 
finding was that government had acted unreasonably in (a) refusing to 
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make an anti-retroviral drug called nevirapine available in the public 
health. sector where the attending doctor considered it medically indicated, 
and in (b) not setting out a time frame for a national program to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
In addition to focusing on the positive aspects of socio-economic 
rights, that is, the obligation of the state to provide certain rights, the Court 
has also focused on what has been seen as the negative component of 
socio-economic rights. In a case involving the protection of a tenant 
against eviction in the process of executing a judgment on debts, the Court 
held that such a process violated the constitutional right to housing.64 
In another landmark judgment in 2001,65 and one which has profound 
ramifications for development of the common law, the Constitutional 
Court considered a claim by a woman who had been attacked and 
seriously injured by a man who was at the time awaiting trial for rape. In 
spite of a previous conviction for indecent assault and a history of violent 
behavior towards women, he had been released unconditionally on his 
own recognizance in the rape matter=despite repeated requests by the 
victim and other members of. the community to keep the assailant in 
custody. The victim sued the police and prosecution for their negligent 
failure to take proactive steps to protect heras a potential further victim. A 
unanimous court stated that the Constitution embodies an objective, 
normative value system that must shape the common law. The 
Constitution obliged the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the 
rights in the Bill of Rights, including the right of women to have their 
safety and security protected. The Constitutional Court found in her favor, 
namely, that the state officials had a legal duty to take steps to prevent 
further violent actions by the perpetrator, and referred the matter back to 
the trial court for determination of further issues in the tort claim. At the 
later trial the Cape High Court found for the plaintiff and ruled that the 
state was indeed liable. 
In one of the most remarkable judgments of the Constitutional Court, 
one that has tremendous potential in redressing the structural 
disadvantages that women experience under customary law, the Court in a 
detailed and far-reaching judgment struck down the customary African 
legal principle of primogeniture as it applies to the law of succession, 
which prevented female children from inheriting when their father died 
intestate.66 The applicants in the cases were two minor daughters of the 
deceased and the sister of an unmarried brother. They had been denied the 
right to be declared heirs; male relatives instead stood to inherit the 
property of'the deceased. What was particularly significant about the cases 
was the involvement of the Women's Legal Center, a women's legal 
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advocacy organization in Cape Town that conducted a major campaign 
around the issues raised by the case.67 , 
Possibilities and Limitations of the Constitutional Pursuit 
of Socio-Economic Rights 
An examination of post-apartheid developments reveals that the 
narrative of the trajectory of gender equality in South African embodies 
profound contradictions. On the one hand, South Africa ranks as one of the 
top democracies in the world with respect to women's representation in 
Parliament, including an impressive number of Ministers, Deputy- 
Ministers, and parliamentarians. The speaker of Parliament is a woman, 
and several females hold top ambassadorial posts.68 
These impressive statistics exist alongside the alarming reality of 
severe poverty amongst women and children, and the shocking reality of 
violence against women. Indeed, all research indicators suggest that 
widespread rape and domestic violence against women has reached 
epidemic proportions.69 This apparent contradiction between impressive 
statistics regarding female involvement in the formal political system- 
particularly in national governance-on the one hand, and widespread 
poverty arid systemic violence against women on the other, raises 
troubling questions. This chapter therefore argues that violence against 
women and its cultural underpinnings are an obstacle to economic 
development overall, and specifically to the capacity of women to enjoy 
the benefits promised in the constitutional framework." Moreover, despite 
solid steps taken by the South African government to improve the plight of 
women, including the provision of housing and improved access to 
education and other social and economic benefits, aggressive 
governmental intervention is imperative in reversing the legacy of 
apartheid and its disproportionate impact on black women. The gap 
between the expansive provisions in South Africa's Constitution and the 
underlying reality of the lives of the majority of South Africa's women 
raises troubling questions regarding the possibilities of legal change in the 
face of extra-legal structural impediments to women's equality. At its most 
basic, this gap raises the question about how a country with such an 
admirable Constitution-and Bill of Rights-with equality at the core-s- 
could elude the majority of women its promises and possibilities.71 
This question is even more perplexing in light of a decade of 
extraordinary equality jurisprudence generated by the Constitutional 
Court, as outlined above, in which the judges eschew a formal equality for 
a more substantive version. The Court has committed itself, if not always 
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successfully, to a transformative vision that centers on women's equality 
and the right to dignity.f In addition, even though the interpretation of 
socio-economic rights by the Court has for the most part been of limited 
effect, the Court has provided an overarching framework that allows some 
possibilities for creative legal advocacy, in conjunction with other non- 
legal methods of advocacy, to address women's poverty. 
The answer to the question, obviously a complex one, may be located 
in the realm of the particular version of masculinity, a by-product of 
colonialism and apartheid. This masculinity, embodying indigenous and 
Western forms of patriarchy, persists despite the constitutional 
commitment to equality.73 This dilemma is not peculiar to South Africa, 
for South Africa is in many ways also a microcosm of other societies, 
particularly those in the developing world that confront tensions, conflicts 
and ambiguities in pursuing rights for women. These contradictions also 
are present in affluent societies, but the reality of pervasive poverty and 
weak state institutions bedevils the quest for equality in poorer countries. 
South Africa's ongoing attempts to pursue rights for women therefore are 
constantly challenged, and often compromised, by this masculinist ethos 
that constitutional guarantees can only erode so far. 
In addition to the conditions of severe economic inequalities and the 
disturbing patterns of private and public" violence, against women, as 
mentioned above, the HIV I AIDS epidemic and its collateral consequences 
severely impede the quest for women's equality. Many rights are 
compromised by women's inability to access economic resources. For 
example, it js extremely difficult for women still caught in a cycle of 
economic dependency and powerlessness to prevent HIV infection or to 
gain access to treatment for AIDS. The core issue, really, is how a society 
is to internalize the formal legal framework that promises gender equality 
and translate it into a human rights culture. 
Conclusion 
In the final analysis, the existence of an expansive constitution is only 
a precondition for legal and other changes. Scholars and advocates have 
noted that despite laudable efforts by women's groups to incorporate 
women's rights into the democratic legal framework, including urging the 
government to pursue a gendered legislative agenda, much work still 
needs to be done. The constitutional and legal foundations have provided a 
framework for some possibilities to transform, or at least alter, women's 
lives for the.better," However, the privatized nature of the South African 
economy and the imperatives of a market-driven agenda may undermine 
the trans formative possibilities of the Constitution. It is widely recognized 
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that women suffer disproportionately from the failure of government to 
provide adequately for health, education, social welfare services, 1.1nd the 
other needs of the population, just like women suffer disproportionately 
when government cutbacks occur. The South African constitutional 
paradigm has not provided a vehicle to fundamentally challenge the South 
African government's economic policies. The Court has merely ensured 
that government policy takes account of its constitutional mandate. 
Consequently, the Constitution cannot comprehensively overturn the deep 
structural inequalities that face 'women in South Africa today; it may, 
however, force the powers that be not to ignore these inequalities. 
Regarding gender equality, at most, the South African constitutional 
framework may demonstrate that a comprehensive constitutional and legal · 
framework is necessary. But it also highlights that a constitutional and 
legal framework must be bolstered by an overarching vision that seeks to 
transform institutions, laws and practices that subjugate women. In 
addition, it must be supplanted by a cultural shift across all sectors of 
society-a shift that takes on board comprehensively the need to eradicate 
gender inequality in the social, political and economic spheres. 
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